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On the Security of Permutation-Only Image
Encryption Schemes
Alireza Jolfaei, Xin-Wen Wu, Senior Member, IEEE, and Vallipuram Muthukkumarasamy
Abstract—Permutation is a commonly used primitive in multi-
media (image/video) encryption schemes, and many permutation-
only algorithms have been proposed in recent years for protection
of multimedia data. In permutation-only image ciphers, the
entries of the image matrix are scrambled using a permutation
mapping matrix which is built by a pseudo-random number
generator (PRNG). The literature on the cryptanalysis of im-
age ciphers indicates that permutation-only image ciphers are
insecure against ciphertext-only attacks and/or known/chosen-
plaintext attacks. However, previous studies have not been able
to ensure the correct retrieval of the complete plaintext elements.
In this paper, we re-visited the previous works on cryptanalysis
of permutation-only image encryption schemes and made the
cryptanalysis work on chosen-plaintext attacks complete and
more efficient. We proved that in all permutation-only image
ciphers, regardless of the cipher structure, the correct permu-
tation mapping is recovered completely by a chosen-plaintext
attack. To the best of our knowledge, for the first time, this
paper gives a chosen-plaintext attack that completely determines
the correct plaintext elements using a deterministic method.
When the plain-images are of size M× N and with L different
color intensities, the number n of required chosen plain-images
to break the permutation-only image encryption algorithm is
n= dlogL(MN)e. The complexity of the proposed attack is
O (n· MN) which indicates its feasibility in a polynomial amount
of computation time. To validate the performance of the proposed
chosen-plaintext attack, numerous experiments were performed
on two recently proposed permutation-only image/video ciphers.
Both theoretical and experimental results showed that the pro-
posed attack outperforms the state of the art cryptanalytic
methods.
Index Terms—Chosen-plaintext attack, cryptanalysis, image
encryption, permutation.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE fast growing demand for digital multimedia applica-tions has opened up a number of challenges regarding
the confidentiality of images and videos in many multimedia-
based services, such as Pay-TV, remote video conferencing,
and medical imaging. Reliable storage and secure transmis-
sion of visual content is a legitimate concern of Intellectual
Property (IP) owners. Thus, there is a strong need to protect
images and videos against unauthorized use or other security
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violations. Encryption is a solution to maintain confidentiality.
Multimedia encryption obfuscates the image/video datastream
to ensure secure transmission of image/video data between two
parties over a public channel. Given the fact that raw video
data is constructed by a sequence of still images (frames),
image encryption techniques can be applied to still images or
single frames in a video.
Since the 1970s, a large number of encryption schemes have
been proposed, some of which have been standardized and
widely adopted all over the world, such as Data Encryption
Standard (DES) [1] and Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
[2]. However, the problem of image encryption is beyond the
application of established and well-known encryption algo-
rithms. This is primarily due to the constraints imposed by the
data structure and the application requirements, such as format
compliance [3], real-time performance [4], complexity [5],
compression efficiency [6], perceptibility [7] and the security
level [8]. To address these concerns, significant attempts have
been made to develop robust encryption schemes for the image
data [9]–[11].
Due to the grid structure of digital images, image encryption
methods utilize three different types of operations: position
permutation, value transformation, and the combination form.
Among different operations, permutation (transposition) is a
commonly used primitive in many image encryption schemes.
This is mainly due to the easy implementation and applica-
bility of permutation in both spatial and frequency domains.
In addition, by combining permutation with other simple
value transformation operations, such as XOR, a highly secure
multimedia encryption scheme can be achieved. In all the well-
known permutation-only ciphers, image entries (or bit-planes)
are permuted by a mapping matrix which is built by a pseudo-
random number generator. From the design point of view,
permutation dissipates the statistical structure of the plaintext
into long range statistics and it is suitable for fast processing
requirements of massive digital multimedia data [12], [13].
Despite the advantages of permutation, it has a number of
inherent limitations. Permutation-only ciphers disclose some
essential characteristics of the plaintext, such as the frequency
distribution of symbols in the plaintext. Also, when the size of
plaintext is small, that is, the number of possible arrangements
for the plaintext elements is less than the key space, the
number of effective keys can be reduced, and hence, the per-
mutation mapping can be disclosed. Moreover, permutation-
only encryption/decryption are not simple sequential opera-
tions that can be done dynamically. In general, permutation
may need a buffer with a size comparable to that of the
plaintext. Therefore, due to the limitations above, permutation-
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only ciphers are nowadays only used in applications where
substitution is technically infeasible and/or only a moderate
level of protection is required. Considering typical examples
of permutation-only image ciphers, in [14]–[16] image entries
are dislocated using pseudo-random permutations; in [17] and
[18] permutation operations are performed on the bit-planes of
the image entries; and in [19] and [20] permutation operations
are performed on DCT/wavelet coefficients.
The security of permutation-only image encryption schemes
has been studied for a long time, and it has been shown that
most of such schemes are insecure against ciphertext-only
attacks and/or known/chosen-plaintext attacks, which is due
to the high information redundancy in the multimedia data
and some specific weaknesses in the encryption algorithms
[21]–[23]. Despite the extensive cryptanalysis of permutation-
only multimedia ciphers, in recent years, many permutation-
only ciphers have been proposed for the protection of mul-
timedia data, including digital images [15], [17], [18] and
video [16], [19], [20]. This is mainly because the above-
mentioned cryptanalytic methods can only be applied to
specific encryption methods and cannot be generalized to a
wider class of permutation-only multimedia ciphers [24]–[27].
In addition, even the best known methods of known/chosen-
plaintext attacks ([28] and [29]) cannot ensure the complete
retrieval of the correct plaintext content, and hence, it is still
ambiguous as to whether the security of permutation-only
image ciphers can be effectively improved by designing new
methods to generate better pseudo-random permutations.
This paper presents a cryptanalysis which breaks most (if
not all) permutation-only multimedia ciphers. In fact, it is
shown that all permutation-only image ciphers are completely
broken by chosen-plaintext attacks and no better pseudo-
random permutation mapping can be realized to offer a higher
level of security against chosen-plaintext attacks. For a suc-
cessful attack, we derived a tight lower bound for the required
number n of chosen plain-images, that is, n = dlogL (MN)e,
comparing to the currently known results O (dlogL (MN)e)
[28], [29], where MN is the size of the image and L − 1
is the maximum color intensity, that is, a color intensity is
specified by l (0 ≤ l ≤ L− 1). The computational complexity
of the proposed attack is O (n ·MN). To verify the feasibility
of the proposed attack, experiments were performed on the
recently proposed permutation-only image ciphers by Rahman
et al. [16] and Fu et al. [17]. Our experimental results support
the theoretical results that pseudo-random permutations alone
cannot provide sufficient security against chosen-plaintext at-
tacks. Compared to the state of the art cryptanalytic methods
of [28] and [29], which partially (quantitatively) determine
the permutation mapping, our chosen-plaintext attack gives a
precise procedure for the careful construction of the required
chosen plain-images, and therefore, completely discloses the
correct permutation mapping with less data and computational
complexity.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
reviews the related work in the cryptanalysis of permutation-
only image ciphers. In section 3, the procedure of the chosen-
plaintext attack is described. Section 4 overviews two typical
permutation-only image ciphers (case studies) proposed by
Rahman et al. [16] and Fu et al. [17]. Experimental results are
shown in Section 5 to support the theoretical cryptanalysis.
Section 6 discusses the advantages of the proposed chosen-
plaintext attack in comparison to the state of the art crypt-
analyses. Finally, the last section concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
The security of permutation-only image ciphers has been
extensively studied. These cryptanalytic studies are briefly
described as follows. In [24], Matias and Shamir analyzed the
security of early permutation-only image encryption schemes
used in analog broadcasting systems. The prominent feature
of such ciphers were that they utilized fewer numbers of
permutations with shorter domains, with the intention of
keeping the bandwidth increase of the encryption process as
low as possible. This made the early permutation-only image
encryption schemes more vulnerable to correlation attacks,
implying that the high correlation properties remaining in the
permuted images could be employed to restore the image. To
address the correlation issues, Matias and Shamir proposed
a permutation-only scheme which scanned pixels in a highly
irregular scanning pattern using a pseudo-random space filling
curve. Bertilsson et al. [25] then showed that Matias and
Shamir’s permutation method is vulnerable to a ciphertext-
only attack. They showed that the pixel data could be reordered
according to a space-filling curve, and hence, the plain-image
could be partially recovered by exploiting the correlation
between subsequent frames.
Later, Kuhn [26] presented a more advanced approach
to break the video signal scramblers commercially em-
ployed within pay-TV conditional access encryption systems
[30], such as EuroCrypt, VideoCrypt and Nagravision, using
ciphertext-only attacks. Kuhn showed that the long portion of
the permuted lines/segments makes the correlation attacks on
the scrambling algorithm feasible by comparing and matching
lines/segment portions. Li et al. [27] then extended Kuhn’s
work by analyzing the permutation domain of particular image
encryption schemes with longer permutation domains, such
as the row-column permutation-only encryption scheme of
[14]. Despite the efforts made to improve the performance of
previous ciphertext-only attacks, these attacks are only appli-
cable to schemes whose permutation domains are considerably
smaller than the size of input images. Indeed, increasing the
permutation domain makes the correlation analysis, and hence
the ciphertext-only attacks, computationally cumbersome.
To reduce the complexity of the exhaustive key search
(a ciphertext-only attack), Li et al. [28] provided a gen-
eral cryptanalysis (a known-plaintext attack and a chosen-
plaintext attack) based on the quantitative relation be-
tween the breaking performance and the number of required
known/chosen plaintexts. They showed that the number n of
required known/chosen plain-images to perform a successful
known/chosen-plaintext attack on a permutation-only cipher
is O (dlogL (MN)e), where MN is the size of the image
and L is the number of color intensities. They also detailed
a procedure for the implementation of their attack which
has O
(
n (MN)
2
)
complexity, where n is the number of
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known/chosen plain-images. Further, Li and Lo [29] improved
the implementation performance of Li et al.’s cryptanalysis
by reducing its computational complexity to O (n (MN)).
As explained in [29], the improvement in computational
complexity is obtained by employing a multi-branch tree
instead of the complex intersection operations in Li et al.’s
attack. Despite the good recovering performance of the Li
et al.’s cryptanalysis, it is not complete and cannot precisely
identify the correct elements of the input plain-images with
regard to chosen-plaintext attacks. This is mainly because Li
et al.’s cryptanalysis is under the assumption of a uniform
distribution of all entries in the plain-image. The distribution
of color intensities in most natural images is not uniform.
More importantly, as explained in [28], Li et al.’s cryptanalysis
can only determine a portion of the correct elements, that is,
almost half of the elements, and predicts the other elements
either by using image processing techniques or by inputting
additional plain-images. Indeed, finding the exact value of
unknown elements of an image by its partially known elements
is hard.
III. PROPOSED CHOSEN-PLAINTEXT ATTACK
Before we elaborate the proposed chosen-plaintext attack,
the following definitions are given to describe a permutation-
only image cipher.
Definition 1: Let S = {s | s = 0, 1, . . . ,MN − 1} denote
the set of entry locations for an image with size M ×N .
Definition 2: Assume that locations of image entries are
scanned in a raster order and they are enumerated by non-
negative integers, which are chosen from the set of entry
locations. Let R denote the matrix of entry locations, that
is,
R=

0 1 · · · N − 1
N N + 1 · · · 2N − 1
...
...
...
...
(M − 1)N (M − 1)N + 1 · · · MN − 1
 . (1)
Definition 3: Let P and C denote the plain-image and
cipher-image, respectively. Note that each plain-image or
cipher-image is represented by an M ×N matrix, where the
entry of such a matrix at position s corresponds to color
intensity. For any s (0 ≤ s ≤MN − 1), let p (s) and c (s)
be the color intensities at the position s of the plain-image
and cipher-image, respectively.
Definition 4: Let X be a finite set. Permutation Πk : X → X
is a bijection which maps the elements of X to itself. Each
secret key k ∈ K assigns a different permutation.
Definition 5: A permutation-only image cipher ρ is defined
by a permutation which, given a secret key k, maps any
entry location s (0 ≤ s ≤MN − 1) of a plain-image to its
corresponding location ρk (s) in the cipher-image, where ρk
is a permutation determined by k.
The permutation-only image cipher is pseudo-random if it
permutes the location of plain-image entries, with an approx-
imate uniform probability, from the set of all possible (#S)!
arrangements.
Let us now explain the procedure of the proposed chosen-
plaintext attack. Deducing the permutation mapping ρk is
equivalent to finding the secret key k. Hence, the problem
of breaking the cipher is defined as an attempt to deduce the
permutation mapping without any prior knowledge of the key.
Consider the adversary as an oracle machine which has access
to the encryption and decryption functions, that is, ρk and
ρ−1k . The adversary asks n number of ρk or ρ
−1
k queries to
obtain a set of n plain-image and cipher-image pairs, that is,
∂ = {(Pi,Ci) | i = 1, 2, . . . , n}.
Proposition 1: For any i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and j (1 ≤ j ≤ n),
if either Pi = Pj or Ci = Cj , then i = j and pairs (Pi,Ci)
and (Pj ,Cj) are identical.
Proof: This proposition is an obvious result, because the
cipher is defined by a bijective permutation.
Definition 6: Given n pairs of plain-images and
cipher-images, namely, (P1,C1) , (P2,C2) , . . . , (Pn,Cn),
for any pair number r (1 ≤ r ≤ n), source location
s (0 ≤ s ≤MN − 1), target location t (0 ≤ t ≤MN − 1),
and color intensity l (0 ≤ l ≤ L− 1), where MN is the size
of the image and L − 1 is the maximum color intensity, the
equivalent set Jr (s) is defined as a set of target locations
in the r-th cipher-image, whose values are equal to the color
intensity l of the s-th location in the r-th plain-image, that is,
Jr (s) = {t | cr (t) = pr (s) , (0 ≤ t ≤MN − 1)} . (2)
Obviously, by definition, the following condition holds for
the equivalent sets:
MN−1⋃
s=0
Jr (s) = {t | t = 0, 1, . . . ,MN − 1} . (3)
For any r (1 ≤ r ≤ n), each pair of plain-images and
cipher-images, that is, (Pr,Cr), involves two matrices with
values assigned to entries. Consider the set S of entry locations
in the plain-image. As explained in the beginning of this
section, the permutation mapping ρ (see Definition 5) maps
the source locations in the plain-image to the target locations
in the cipher-image. To uniquely determine the permutation
mapping, it is sufficient to study the arrangement of distinct
entries in the pair of plain-images and cipher-images. In
the case that all entries are assigned distinct values, the
permutation is uniquely determined by a single pair. However,
the set of color intensities, that is, {0, 1, . . . , L− 1}, is finite
and the images under study may have more than L entries.
Therefore, for any r (1 ≤ r ≤ n) and s (0 ≤ s ≤MN − 1),
by the pigeonhole principle the cardinality of some equivalent
sets #Jr (s) may not equal 1, and it is thus difficult to
deduce a unique permutation mapping by knowing only one
pair of plain-images and cipher-images. Hence, we need to
have enough pairs of plain and cipher-images to determine
the target location where each source location is mapped into.
Therefore, the interest lies in using a collection of pairs,
all of which have repeated values, to uniquely determine
the underlying permutation. Clearly, the mapping of location
s is uniquely determined if for any s (0 ≤ s ≤MN − 1)
and r (1 ≤ r ≤ n), the equivalent sets Jr (s) intersect in a
singleton, that is,
⋂n
r=1 Jr (s) = {ρ (s)}, and hence it is
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sufficient to determine the permutation ρ if this is true for
all s. Two further questions then appear:
• Is this condition sufficient to determine unique ρ?
• With what accuracy and computational cost can the
mapping ρ be determined from sufficient pairs?
To answer these questions, we need to find a relationship
among the number of plain-image/cipher-image pairs n, the
number of locations MN and the number of assigned values
in the locations L. To perform a successful chosen-plaintext
attack, it is necessary to find a lower bound on the number
of required pairs. However, it is possible for two given pairs
to be related by a permutation on the color intensities, such
that both pairs give the same information regarding possible
plain-image and cipher-image locations. Thus, a useful bound
on the number of required pairs will entail some restriction
that avoids this possible redundancy.
A best case in connection with lower bounds on pairs can
be sharply stated as follows:
Lemma 1: Given L color intensities and MN locations,
for any permutation ρ, which is applied to get the respective
cipher-images, there exist n ≥ dlogL (MN)e, such that ρ is
uniquely determined by making use of n pairs of plain-images
and cipher-images.
Proof: Consider dlogL (MN)e plain-images constructed
by the dlogL (MN)e digit expansions in radix L for s =
0, 1, . . . ,MN−1 in respective locations. Taken the positional
digits sequentially, these values uniquely label each of the
MN locations, and therefore ρ is uniquely determined by
finding the target locations which exactly match the source
labelling. For instance, if M = N = L = 2, then 2 plain-
images can be constructed by 2 digit expansions in radix 2
for s = 0, 1, 2, 3, that is, s′ = 00, 01, 10, 11. The construction
procedure of the chosen plain-image/cipher-image pairs is
depicted in Figure 1.
Source image
[
0 1
2 3
]
2 digit expansion in radix 2−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Expanded source image
[
00 01
10 11
]
,
Plain-image #1 from bit-plane 0
[
0 1
0 1
]
Encryption ρ−−−−−−−→Cipher-image #1
[
ρ (0) ρ (1)
ρ (0) ρ (1)
]
,
Plain-image #2 from bit-plane 1
[
0 0
1 1
]
Encryption ρ−−−−−−−→Cipher-image #2
[
ρ (0) ρ (0)
ρ (1) ρ (1)
]
.
Fig. 1. Construction procedure of the chosen plain-image/cipher-image pairs
for M = N = L = 2.
If fewer pairs are used, that is, n < dlogL (MN)e, then by
counting the possible sequences of L values for each location,
that is Ln < MN , it is easy to verify that there would
be less numbers than MN available locations. Thus, by the
pigeonhole principle at least two locations would get the same
source values in all pairs. It follows for any permutation ρ that
we would be unable to distinguish between the mapped target
locations.
We can now prove the following result.
Theorem 1: The number of required chosen plain-
images n to perform a successful chosen-plaintext attack
on a permutation-only image encryption algorithm is n =
dlogL (MN)e.
Proof: This theorem is an obvious result of Lemma 1.
Theoretically, the permutation mapping can be easily deduced
using an input matrix of size MN whose entries are sequen-
tially labelled with distinct values 0, 1, . . . ,MN . However,
this is not practical because the encryption/decryption machine
is only defined for entries of at most L−1, which is usually less
than the number of entries. Therefore, to make the attack fea-
sible, the entries are firstly expanded by dlogL (MN)e digits
with radix L. This matrix is then separated into dlogL (MN)e
numbers of plain-images based on the digit positions in radix
L. Once permutation ρ is applied to the plain-images, it
produces dlogL (MN)e cipher-images with entries in radix
L. A combination of cipher-images using the positional digits
reveals the mapped locations of the original locations.
To illustrate the attack procedure, consider a 5 × 5 matrix
case.
1) If L = 1, no further progress can be made toward deter-
mining the permutation, since the only plain-image/cipher-
image pair has all entries assigned equal values.
2) If L = 2, then the permutation can be determined by
dlog2 (25)e = 5 pairs of plain-images/cipher-images. One
way to see this is to construct an input matrix P1 with 5-bit
binary expansions for the 25 locations s = 0, 1, . . . , 24:
P1 =

00000 00001 00010 00011 00100
00101 00110 00111 01000 01001
01010 01011 01100 01101 01110
01111 10000 10001 10010 10011
10100 10101 10110 10111 11000
 . (4)
Splitting this matrix into five binary source matrices based
on bit positions, and application of the permutation ρ to
these, produces five binary target matrices. When these
matrices are recombined using positional bits, the mapped
locations of the original locations s = 0, 1, . . . , 24 will be
revealed.
3) If L = 3, then a similar treatment requires only
dlog3 (25)e = 3 plain-image/cipher-image pairs. The origi-
nal locations s = 0, 1, . . . , 24, can be expanded to 3 digits
in ternary representation. Hence,
P2 =

000 001 002 010 011
012 020 021 022 100
101 102 110 111 112
120 121 122 200 201
202 210 211 212 220
 . (5)
Then, plain-images whose entries are 0, 1 and 2 are
generated by splitting this matrix into three. Cipher-images
are then generated by applying the permutation to all
three plain-images. Recombining target matrices as radix
3 values gives the permuted locations of s = 0, 1, . . . , 24,
as required to determine the permutation.
4) Until one gets L ≤ 24, more than one pair is necessary
to deduce the permutation, as per the pigeonhole principle,
some value has to be used more than once in a pair.
Next, we discuss whether it is possible to maximize the
attack performance by choosing fewer than dlogL (MN)e
pairs. This can only happen when the available pairs are well
chosen. However, finding the exact minimum number of pairs
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to deduce permutation mapping is equivalent to the classic
problem of the Test Cover [31], where a pair of a set of
elements and a collection of subsets of the elements, named
tests, are given. This problem is to determine the minimum
sized subset of a collection of sets such that for every pair
there is a test in the selection that contains exactly one of
the two elements. It has been proved that finding the exact
minimum sized subset is an NP-hard problem [31]. In practice,
knowing the minimum set of pairs may not be as important as
the accuracy of determining the permutation mapping. Indeed,
the proposed approach determines the permutation mapping if
there is sufficient information, and detects the lack of sufficient
information when there is not.
Now we evaluate the computational complexity of the
proposed chosen-plaintext attack. The first step in the attack
procedure is splitting n sources from the n digit expansions in
radix L of MN entry locations. The computational complexity
of this step is O (n ·MN). The second step in the attack
procedure is the recombination of n target matrices as radix L
values which gives the permuted locations of 0 to MN−1. The
computational complexity of this step is also O (n ·MN). As
a result, the computational complexity of the proposed attack
is O (n ·MN). This shows that the proposed cryptanalysis is
efficiently achievable by means of a limited number of chosen-
plaintexts using a polynomial amount of computation time.
IV. CASE STUDIES – TYPICAL PERMUTATION-ONLY
IMAGE/VIDEO CIPHERS
To verify the correctness of the above-discussed chosen-
plaintext attack, it was tested on two typical permutation-
only image/video ciphers. With respect to this, the recently
proposed permutation-only image/video ciphers by Rahman et
al. [16] and Fu et al. [17] are briefly overviewed, respectively.
A. Rahman et al.’s Encryption Scheme
Rahman et al.’s encryption algorithm contains two parts: a
key initializing procedure and a scrambling algorithm. Using
a two-dimensional He´non map [32] described in equation (6),
the key initializing procedure provides a binary sequence,
which is used as a seed point to run the scrambling algorithm.
The initializing procedure is briefly described as
{rn (x, y)}1023n=0 = {(xn+1, yn+1) |
xn+1 = 1 + yn − 1.4x2n, yn+1 = 0.3xn}1023n=0 , (6)
{bn}1023n=0 = {σ (rn (x, y))}1023n=0 , (7)
where {rn (x, y)}1023n=0 is the chaotic real-valued sequence
generated by the He´non map, σ is the discretization function,
and {bn}1023n=0 is the generated binary sequence. The chaotic
binary sequence generated by the He´non map is then used as
the secret key to scramble the position of pixels in a Region
Of Interest (ROI).
For a ROI R = {R (i, j)}0≤i≤M−10≤j≤N−1 in an image P =
{p (i, j)}0≤i≤H−10≤j≤W−1, the scrambling function employs the fol-
lowing four transformations to scramble R and map it to
R′ = {R′ (i, j)}0≤i≤M−10≤j≤N−1 , where H × W represents the
size of input image and M × N denotes the size of the
Algorithm 1 Rahman et al.’s scrambling algorithm
1: procedure SCRAMBLING(R,M,N, no)
{Scrambling computes the encrypted ROI R′ given the
input ROI R and the secret key (M,N, no)}
2: for itt← 1, no do
3: r ← 2 (2M + 2N − 1)× (itt− 1)
4: for bnt← 0, 1023 do
5: p← η+ξ × (br+0 ⊕ bbnt)+ε× (br+1 ⊕ bbnt)
6: for j ← 0, N − 1 do
7: R1← TRANS1 (R)j,pbr+M+j⊕bbnt,22.5◦
8: end for
9: for i← 0,M − 1 do
10: R2← TRANS2 (R1)i,pbr+i⊕bbnt,112.5◦
11: end for
12: for k ← 0,M +N − 2 do
13: R3←TRANS3 (R2)k,pbr+M+N+k⊕bbnt,202.5◦
14: end for
15: for z ← − (N − 1) ,M − 1 do
16: R4←TRANS4(R3)z,pbr+4M+4N−2+z⊕bbnt,292.5◦
17: end for
18: end for
19: R← R4
20: end for
21: R′ ← R4
22: end procedure
ROI. The relationships M ≤ H and N ≤ W hold in each
image. The first transformation is defined as the mapping
R′ = TRANS1 (R)j,pr,22.5◦ , where 0 ≤ j ≤ N − 1. This
is designed to rotate each pixel in the j-th column of the
ROI. If r = 0 then the rotation is towards the 22.5◦ right
direction by p pixels, if r = 1 then the rotation is towards the
22.5◦ left direction by p pixels. The second transformation is
defined as the mapping R′ = TRANS2 (R)i,pr,112.5◦ , where
0 ≤ i ≤ M − 1. This transformation is designed to rotate
each pixel in the i-th row of the ROI. If r = 0 then the
rotation is towards the 112.5◦ down direction by p pixels, if
r = 1 then the rotation is towards the 112.5◦ up direction by
p pixels. The third transformation is defined as the mapping
R′ = TRANS3 (R)k,pr,202.5◦ , where 0 ≤ k ≤ M + N − 2.
This transformation is designed to rotate each pixel at position
(x, y) of ROIR satisfying x+y = k. If r = 0 then the rotation
is p pixels towards the 202.5◦ upper-right direction, if r = 1
then the rotation is p pixels towards the 202.5◦ lower-left
direction. The fourth transformation is defined as the mapping
R′ = TRANS4 (R)k,pr,292.5◦ , where 1 − N ≤ k ≤ M − 1.
This is designed to rotate each pixel at position (x, y) of ROI
R satisfying x − y = k. If r = 0 then the rotation is p
pixels towards the 292.5◦ upper-left direction, if r = 1 then the
rotation is p pixels towards the 292.5◦ lower-right direction.
Rahman et al. used Algorithm 1 to scramble (encrypt) the data
in a ROI.
In fact, Rahman et al.’s scrambling algorithm is a
permutation-only cipher that encrypts a plain-image by per-
muting the positions of all pixels in 22.5◦, 112.5◦, 202.5◦ and
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292.5◦ degrees towards random directions. Rahman et al.’s
scrambling algorithm dissipates the statistical structure of the
plain-image into long range statistics. The scrambling algo-
rithm is invertible so the de-scrambling algorithm is possible.
Moreover, the scrambling algorithm is influenced by the binary
sequence generated by the He´non map, the dimension of the
ROI and the control parameters such as no, η, ξ and ε.
B. Fu et al.’s Encryption Scheme
Fu et al.’s encryption algorithm is a bit-level permutation
scheme, which encrypts plain-images in two iterative stages.
Firstly, the plain-image is extended into a bit-plane (binary)
image, which is constructed by expanding every column of
the plain-image into bit-plane columns. An image of size
M × N with 256 color intensities can be extended to a bit-
plane image with size M × 8N . In the first stage, a pseudo-
random sequence is generated by a Chebyshev map, ensuring
that there is no repetition, and this sequence is interpreted
as the permutation mapping. A Chebyshev map is a typical
invertible iterated map that generates orthogonal real-valued
sequences. The Chebyshev map of degree D (D = 2, 3, . . . )
is based on a trigonometric function defined as
sn+1 = f (sn) = cos
(
D cos−1 (sn)
)
, (8)
where f : S → S, S ∈ [−1,+1]. To avoid the harmful effect
of transitional procedure, the Chebyshev map is firstly iterated
for N0 times, where N0 is a constant. Then, two permutation
sequences of length M and N× 8 are generated, which are
employed to shuffle the rows and columns of the bit-plane
image, respectively. In the second stage, the shuffled bit-plane
is firstly divided into eight bit-squares of equal size. Then,
each bit-square is shuffled independently with different control
parameters by a discretized version of Arnold Cat Map (ACM)
with different control parameters. The discretized ACM is
defined as[
xn+1
yn+1
]
=
[
1 a
b ab+ 1
] [
xn
yn
]
mod N, (9)
where N is the number of pixels in one row (or column), a
and b are control parameters, x and y are pixel coordinates,
and xn, yn ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}. The determinant of this map
is 1; hence, it is invertible and area-preserving. This stage is
iterated m (1 ≤ m) rounds. Finally, both stages 1 and 2 are
iterated n times. To construct the cipher image, all the 8 bit-
squares are concatenated from left to right and recovered to
a pixel-plane. In fact, both stages of Fu et al.’s encryption
algorithm can be viewed as a one permutation stage which
scrambles the entries of the bit-plane image. As explained by
Fu et al. [17], the image translation to a bit-plane image and its
inverse are straightforward linear transformations. Therefore,
without loss of generality, we assume that Fu et al.’s algorithm
encrypts bit-plane images. (s0, D, a, b,m, n) is the secret key
for Fu et al.’s encryption algorithm.
V. EXPERIMENTS
According to the proposed cryptanalysis (see Section 3), the
permutation mapping of the case studies, which were described
in Section 4, can be easily deduced by dlogL (MN)e chosen
plain-images. To verify this claim, numerous experiments were
performed. Figure 2 depicts some of the test images which
were used to perform the experiments. These test images
were of size M × N = 256 × 256 and 512 × 512 with
L = 256 color intensities. Figure 2 also depicts the bit-plane
images of the test images. To deduce a unique permutation
mapping, the dlogL (MN)e chosen plain-images were built
based on the proposed coding (see Section 3). To verify the
breaking performance, the corresponding cipher-images were
decrypted with the inferred permutation matrices, and the
recovered plain-images were compared with the original test
images depicted in Figure 2. In the following subsections, the
experimental results for breaking Rahman et al.’s and Fu et
al.’s encryption algorithms will be given.
A. Experimental Results for Rahman et al.’s Encryption Algo-
rithm
The test images depicted in Figure 2 were encrypted
by Rahman et al.’s encryption algorithm using (x0, y0) =
(0.45, 0.35), no = 1024, η = 1, ξ = 2, and ε = 3 as the
secret key. The corresponding cipher-images are depicted in
Figure 3. According to the proposed cryptanalysis, to deduce
the 256 × 256 permutation mapping, the adversary only
requires dlog256 (256× 256)e = 2 plain-images. In addition,
for 512 × 512 case, a similar attack procedure requires only
dlog256 (512× 512)e = 3 plain-images. To deduce a unique
permutation mapping, the plain-images were built based on
the proposed coding (see Section 3). The chosen plain-images
required for cryptanalysis and their corresponding cipher-
images are depicted in Figure 4. The breaking results of cipher-
images #1 and #4 are demonstrated in Figure 5.
B. Experimental Results for Fu et al.’s Encryption Algorithm
The bit-plane (binary) images depicted in Figure 2
were encrypted by Fu et al.’s encryption algorithm using
(s0, D, a, b,m, n) = (0.7, 4, 5, 2, 3, 1) as the secret key. The
corresponding cipher bit-planes and cipher-images are de-
picted in Figure 6. To deduce the 256 × 2048 permutation
mapping, the adversary only requires dlog2 (256× 2048)e =
19 pairs of input/output binary images. For a 512 × 4096
case, a similar procedure requires only dlog2 (512× 4096)e =
21 pairs of input/output binary images. To achieve a unique
permutation mapping, the input images were built based on the
proposed coding. The required pairs of chosen input/output
binary images for obtaining the 256 × 2048 permutation
mapping are depicted in Figure 7. Figure 7 also depicts the
corresponding cipher-images constructed by the output binary
images. The breaking results of cipher-images #2 and #5 are
demonstrated in Figure 8.
VI. DISCUSSION
In this section, we elaborate the advantages of our attack
over the chosen-plaintext attacks of [28] and [29]. To this
end, we firstly explain the general procedure that is under-
taken in a chosen-plaintext attack. To successfully disclose
1556-6013 (c) 2015 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See
http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI
10.1109/TIFS.2015.2489178, IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY 7
Image #1
with size
256 × 256
Bit-plane image of
image #1 with size
256 × 2048
Image #2
with size
256 × 256
Bit-plane image of
image #2 with size
256 × 2048
Image #3
with size
256 × 256
Bit-plane image of
image #3 with size
256 × 2048
Image #4
with size
512 × 512
Bit-plane image of
image #4 with size
512 × 4096
Image #5
with size
512 × 512
Bit-plane image of
image #5 with size
512 × 4096
Image #6
with size
512 × 512
Bit-plane image of
image #6 with size
512 × 4096
Fig. 2. Test images used in the experiments.
Cipher-image #1 Cipher-image #2 Cipher-image #3 Cipher-image #4 Cipher-image #5 Cipher-image #6
Fig. 3. Corresponding cipher-images of the six test images.
Encryption−−−−−→
Encryption−−−−−→
Encryption−−−−−→
Encryption−−−−−→
Encryption−−−−−→
(a) (b)
Fig. 4. Required pairs of chosen input/output images (a) with size 256 × 256 for finding the permutation matrix of size 256 × 256, and (b) with size
512 × 512 for finding the permutation matrix of size 512 × 512.
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(a) (b)
Fig. 5. Decrypted images of the (a) cipher-image #1 and (b) cipher-image #4.
Encryption outcome of bit-plane image #1
Encryption outcome of bit-plane image #2
Encryption outcome of bit-plane image #3
Encryption outcome of bit-plane image #4
Encryption outcome of bit-plane image #5
Encryption outcome of bit-plane image #6
Fig. 6. Corresponding encrypted bit-plane images of the six test bit-plane images.
a permutation-only cipher that works on images of size MN
with L color intensities, it is sufficient to input a source image
with distinct entries. However, from the practical point of
view, constructing a source image with distinct entries may
not be feasible, because the set of color intensities is finite and
the number of entry locations usually exceeds the number of
color intensities. Therefore, a collection of plain-images, all of
which have repeated values, is required to uniquely determine
the underlying permutation.
To disclose the underlying permutation mapping, the interest
lies in utilizing a number of plain-images whose combination
using the positional digits, constructs an image with distinct
entries. This problem is equivalent to splitting a source image
with distinct entries into a number of plain-images whose
entries are equal or less than the maximum color intensity. As
explained in Section 3, to split the source image, the adversary
needs to expand the source entries using n digit expansions
in radix L where n digits clearly produce Ln different values.
This implies the following relationship for the number MN
of entry locations:
Ln < MN ≤ Ln+1. (10)
The inequalities above indicate that the source entries
can be expanded by O (dlogL (MN)e) digits, and therefore,
the source image can split into O (dlogL (MN)e) plain-
images. In other words, O (dlogL (MN)e) plain-images con-
struct a source image with distinct entries. The expression
O (dlogL (MN)e) denotes a set of functions f (L,MN), such
that, for sufficiently large L and MN , there exists a constant
coefficient c (0 < c) satisfying f (L,MN) ≤ cdlogL (MN)e.
In this inequality, it is certain that 1 ≤ c, because n digits
with radix L can produce Ln different color intensities, and if
n < dlogL (MN)e, then Ln < MN ; and by the pigeonhole
principle, at least two entries would get the same values.
Therefore, 1 ≤ c.
Following the arguments above, in a known-plaintext
attack, in which the plain-images are randomly selected,
c dlogL (MN)e plain-images are required to successfully re-
construct a source image with distinct entries, where 1 ≤ c.
In a chosen-plaintext attack, the aim is to find a procedure
with a reduced number of required plain-images. As proved
in Section 3, a tight lower bound for the required number of
chosen plain-images (c = 1) is achieved when the MN source
entries are labelled with distinct values 0, 1, . . . ,MN−1, and
then expanded by dlogL (MN)e digits with radix L.
To ensure the correct retrieval of the permutation mapping
by using the least number of chosen plain-images, that is,
n = dlogL (MN)e, an adversary requires a precise and easy
method to construct chosen plain-images. Neither [28] nor [29]
proposed exact methods for the construction of the chosen
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Encryption−−−−−→
Encryption−−−−−→
Encryption−−−−−→
Encryption−−−−−→
Encryption−−−−−→
Encryption−−−−−→
Encryption−−−−−→
Encryption−−−−−→
Encryption−−−−−→
Encryption−−−−−→
Encryption−−−−−→
Encryption−−−−−→
Encryption−−−−−→
Encryption−−−−−→
Encryption−−−−−→
Encryption−−−−−→
Encryption−−−−−→
Encryption−−−−−→
Encryption−−−−−→
Fig. 7. Required pairs of chosen input/output bit-plane images with size 256 × 2048 for finding the permutation matrix of size 256 × 2048.
(a) (b)
Fig. 8. Decrypted images of the (a) cipher-image #2 and (b) cipher-image #5.
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TABLE I
PERFORMANCE TEST
M N L n
Correctly recovered
elements
Run-time in seconds
Proposed [28] [29] Proposed [28] [29]
87 296 23 4 100% 45% 45% 0.0158 0.7106 0.2757
1464 1134 16 6 100% 37% 37% 0.8664 68.5163 0.9052
378 1202 7 7 100% 37% 37% 0.3577 21.9006 0.3711
737 1095 28 5 100% 37.5% 37.5% 0.3532 27.8160 0.4309
153 1051 4 9 100% 35% 35% 0.1200 9.9637 0.1621
974 763 16 5 100% 35.5% 35.5% 0.3123 25.6035 0.4292
2003 1573 5 10 100% 35% 35% 2.6514 217.1524 3.1157
815 1042 3 13 100% 34% 34% 0.9435 76.1394 1.3804
517 716 3 12 100% 33% 33% 0.3882 30.6036 0.3957
1585 3061 3 15 100% 32% 32% 3.9779 501.0402 4.9172
plain-images for a successful chosen-plaintext attack. In [28],
Li et al. provided two rules for the construction of chosen
plain-images: (1) the histogram of each chosen plain-image
should be as uniform as possible; and (2) the i-dimensional
(2 ≤ i ≤ n) histogram of any i chosen plain-images should
be as uniform as possible. However, the rules above are not
sufficiently strict, and therefore, they make a great variety
of entry arrangements possible for producing chosen plain-
images, which may not lead to a construction of a source
image with distinct entries. Hence, Li et al.’s chosen-plaintext
attack may need more plain-images compared to our chosen-
plaintext attack.
For a better comparison, when the number n of chosen
plain-images is dlogL (MN)e, we evaluated the performance
of the chosen-plaintext attacks with respect to the percentage
of correctly recovered elements of the permutation matrix and
the run-time. To this end, we ran 100 independent experiments
with distinct M , N and L. In the performance test, we
implemented the attacks using an un-optimized MATLAB
code on a machine with Intel Core i7 2.5 GHz processor
and 16 GB of installed memory running under Windows 7.
The performance statistics for 10 experiments are reported in
Table I. The experimental results confirm that compared to
the chosen-plaintext attacks of [28] and [29], the proposed
chosen-plaintext attack successfully recovers the complete
permutation mapping with less number of chosen plain-images
and less run-time.
Figure 9 depicts the curves for breaking performance of
our chosen-plaintext attack and Li et al.’s cryptanalytic method
[28], for a case where M = 256, N = 2048, and L = 2. These
curves display the percentage of correctly recovered elements
of the permutation matrix, with respect to the number of
chosen plain-images. A comparison between the curves shows
that there is a significant difference between the breaking
performances of the attacks, which is mainly due to Li et
al.’s criteria for constructing chosen plain-images. Indeed, Li
et al.’s creation method for chosen plain-images is not precise
and it cannot ensure the correct retrieval of the permutation
matrix elements.
Fig. 9. Percentage of correctly recovered elements with respect to the number
of chosen plain-images.
Based on the discussions above, the main advantage of the
proposed attack over the chosen-plaintext attacks of [28] and
[29] is that it presents a precise method for the construc-
tion of the chosen plain-images which ensures the correct
retrieval of the permutation mapping. In addition, the pro-
posed attack gives a tight lower bound for the number of
required chosen plain-images for a successful chosen-plaintext
attack. In other words, while the number of required plain-
images of the chosen-plaintext attacks of [28] and [29] is
an order of dlogL (MN)e, that is, O (dlogL (MN)e), the
number of required plain-images of the proposed chosen-
plaintext attack is precisely dlogL (MN)e. It is true that for
sufficiently large MN and L, dlogL (MN)e (the number of
plain-images that our algorithm requires) would grow as fast
as any O (dlogL (MN)e) (the number of plain-images that
[28] and [29] require); however, our chosen-plaintext attack is
more accurate than Li et al.’s attack, as it provably gives the
smallest number for the chosen plain-images. Furthermore, the
computational complexity of Li et al.’s attack [28], Li and Lo’s
attack [29], and our attack are O
(
n (MN)
2
)
, O (n ·MN)
and O (n ·MN), respectively, where n denotes the number
of chosen plain-images used for a successful chosen-plaintext
attack. Although the proposed chosen-plaintext attack and
the chosen-plaintext attack of [29] have the same order of
computational complexity, that is, O (n ·MN), our attack is
faster than that of [29], as confirmed by the results of the
performance test (see the run-time comparison in Table I).
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proved that permutation-only image ci-
phers are completely broken against chosen-plaintext attacks.
Based on the proposed attack, the permutation mapping
can be easily deduced using an input matrix of size MN
whose distinct entries are selected from the dlogL (MN)e
digit expansions in radix L for 0, 1, . . . ,MN − 1 in re-
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spective locations. In a practical attack, the number n of
required chosen plain-images to break the permutation-only
image encryption algorithm is dlogL (MN)e. It has also been
found that the attack complexity is practically small, that is,
O (n ·MN). This shows that the proposed cryptanalysis is
efficiently achievable by means of a limited number of chosen
plain-images using a polynomial amount of computation time.
Some experiments on a permutation-only image cipher have
been performed to validate the performance of the proposed
chosen-plaintext attack. Both theoretical and experimental
results verified the feasibility of the proposed attack. From
the results of this paper, it is concluded that no better pseudo-
random permutations can be realized to offer a higher level
of security against plaintext attacks. To offer an acceptable
security level against plaintext attacks, the pseudo-random
permutations should be updated to a frequency smaller than
dlogL (MN)e. In comparison with Li et al.’s, and Li and Lo’s
plaintext attacks, our cryptanalysis is exact, offering a lower
bound on the number of required chosen plain-images and can
be achieved in less computation time.
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